First, we review the mechanism design formalism, in terms of games of incomplete information. Then, we introduce the notion of an indirect mechanism, presenting the English and Dutch auctions as examples. Finally, we cover the Revelation Principle, which can transform any mechanism into a direct one, ensuring incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Framework
The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second stage.
After the designer announces their choice of mechanism, the agents face a game of incomplete information. 1 Formally, such a 1 Consist with our earlier comment, we restrict our present attention to one-shot games of incomplete information. That said, we aim to apply our methodology to extensive-form games of incomplete information.
game is denoted by Γ = [Ω, [n] , {A i } i∈n , {T i } i∈n , g, {u i } i∈n ], where [n] is the set of players (or agents), of size n; A i is the set of actions available to player i ∈ [n], with A = ∏ n i=1 A i as the joint action space; and T i is the set of types (private information) available to player i ∈ [n], with T = ∏ n i=1 T i as the joint type space. Additionally, a joint distribution F over types is assumed to be common knowledge, known to both the players and the designer.
We define a strategy of a player i as a function s i : T i → A i , and use s t to denote the vector (s 1 (t 1 ), . . . , s n (t n )). The function g : A → Ω maps a joint action profile into a space Ω of possible outcomes; that is, g(s(t)) is the outcome when player i of type t i plays strategy s i and the remaining players of type t −i play strategy s −i . 2 Finally, player i's utility u i : Ω × T → R depends on both the outcome of the game and (in general) all players' types.
Given a game Γ, its solution is a joint strategy profile s * that the players are predicted to play under certain assumptions. For example, dominant-strategy equilibria when they exist, and otherwise the Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution concept, are often applied to solve a game. We define both concepts in our current formalism, presently. Definition 1.1. A strategy vector s = (s i , s −i ) ∈ S is an ex-ante BayesNash equilibrium in a game Γ if no player can increase their ex-ante the revelation principle 2 expected utility by unilaterally changing their strategy:
(1) Definition 1.2. A strategy s i for player i ∈ [n] is dominant if it is (weakly) optimal, regardless of the other players' actions and types: i.e.,
A strategy vector s ∈ S is a dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) if all players play dominant strategies. At a DSE, s i is (weakly) optimal for player i, regardless of what other players know or do.
Returning to the MD framework, observe that the designer's choice of mechanism θ ∈ Θ in the first stage induces a one-shot game of incomplete information among the players in the second stage, namely
. Mechanisms can then be evaluated with respect to their ensuing outcomes g θ (s * ), where s * is a predicted solution to the game.
The criteria by which a mechanism should be evaluated are highly domain dependent. Still, it suffices to mention two alternative means of evaluation. First, it may be the designer's goal to implement a social choice function f : T → Ω, in which case a design could be deemed successful if g θ (s(t)) ∈ f (t), for all type profiles t, or partially successful to the extent g θ (s(t)) intersects f (t). Alternatively, the designer may seek to maximize a numeric function of the solution to the induced game, 3 such as a social welfare function 3 There is an implicit equilibrium selection function that cannot be overlooked; in case the predicted solution is not unique, welfare/revenue could, for example, be computed in either the worst-case or the expected case.
4 Note that within the MD framework these goals could easily be relaxed so that, for example, welfare/revenue is maximized or exceeds some threshold value only with high probability.
In much of the MD literature, the problem is greatly simplified by reliance on the revelation principle, which argues that the strategic outcome of any mechanism can be replicated by a direct mechanism (i.e., a mechanism in which agents simply report their types). Direct (vs. indirect) mechanisms, and the revelation principle, are the subjects of the remainder of this lecture.
Indirect Mechanisms
Definition 2.1. A direct mechanism is one in which the space of possible actions is equal to the space of possible types.
In direct mechanisms, the equilibrium notions of BNE and DSE correspond to the analogous notions of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). In a direct mechanism, reporting (i.e., "playing") one's true type is called truth-telling. the revelation principle 3 Definition 2.2. A (direct) mechanism is BIC iff truthtelling is a BayesNash equilibrium: i.e.,
Definition 2.3. A (direct) mechanism is DSIC iff truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium: i.e.,
Examples of direct mechanisms include first-, second-, and thirdprice auctions (assuming the space of possible bids is restricted to the space of possible values).
All other mechanisms are called indirect. Examples of indirect mechanisms include the English, or ascending, auction, and the Dutch, or descending auction.
Example 2.4. The English auction consists of a number of rounds. On round k = 1, 2, . . ., the auctioneer offers the good at price p = k , asking all bidders if they are interested in the good at that price. The auction continues so long as more than one bidder is interested. The auction terminates, say at round t, when either exactly one or no bidders remain interested. If there is one interested bidder, then she wins, paying t ; if there are no interested bidders then a winner is selected at random from the set of interested bidders during round t − 1. This winner pays (t − 1) .
In this auction, actions consist of t binary answers to queries "Would you like the good at price p?". In practice, it may be easier for bidders to answer queries like this one, rather than articulate their exact value, which may be part of the reason why this auction format is so widely used. 5 Example 2.5. The Dutch auction also consists of a number of rounds, but in this case, the price p is initialized high enough so that no bidders are interested. The price is then decremented successively by until a bidder (or a set of bidders) declares their interest in the item. That bidder is declared the winner (or a tie is broken randomly); the winner receives the item and pays the final price.
Not surprisingly, Dutch auctions are popular in the Netherlands.
The Revelation Principle
Theorem 3.1 (Revelation Principle). Given a mechanism M for which there exists an equilibrium strategy profile s, we can construct an equivalent direct mechanism M * in which truthtelling is likewise an equilibrium.
the revelation principle 4
By equivalence of two mechanisms M and M , given two corresponding strategy profiles s and s , we mean that the same type profile t yields the exact same outcome in each mechanism: i.e., g(s(t)) = g (s (t)), for all t ∈ T. If M is assumed to be a direct mechanism, then equivalence means g(s(t)) = g (t), for all t ∈ T.
By the revelation principle, if there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in mechanism M, we can produce a BIC mechanism M * . Furthermore, when bidders play according to these respective equilibria, the outcomes in M and M * are identical. Likewise, if there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium in mechanism M, then we can produce a DSIC mechanism M * , so that when bidders play according to these respective equilibria, the outcomes in M and M * are identical.
One further point before we prove the theorem: The revelation principle does not only apply to indirect mechanisms. It applies to all mechanisms, and can therefore be applied, for example, to a first-, second-, third-, etc.-price, or even an all-pay auction, to convert them, together with their BNE, into direct, BIC mechanisms.
Proof. Given a (possibly indirect) mechanism M, we construct a direct mechanism M * as follows:
• Elicit types t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n from each of the n participants.
• Simulate M by performing i's equilibrium action on his behalf, assuming i's type is t i .
• Return the outcome produced by M. We can think of the construction as a robot that first asks all players for their types, and then runs the equilibrium strategy on their behalf. In pictures (see Figure 1) , the revelation principle constructs a direct mechanism M * , from a (possibly indirect) mechanism M together with an equilibrium s. Each agent reports a (possibly incorrect) type t i to M * , which simulates s i (t i ). The outcome of M * is the same as that of M, as long as agents report their types truthfully, which they are incentivized to do, insofar as the guarantees of the equilibrium incentivized sticking to the equilibrium strategy in the first place. That is, if player i lies to the robot (and if they are the only one lying), the robot will run everyone else's equilibrium strategy based on their true types, except for player i's. The outcome will be the exact same outcome as running M, assuming i deviates from their equilibrium strategy. But this was not in i's best interest in M, so likewise, it cannot be in i's best interest in M * .
Example 3.2. Consider a modified second-price auction M in which the winner pays twice the second-highest bidder's bid. This auction has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which the bidders bid half their values.
The mechanism M * , constructed according to the Revelation Principle, works as follows:
• Elicit values v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n from each of the n bidders.
• For each bidder i, submit the sealed bid v i /2.
• Return the outcome produced by the variant auction (M).
This mechanism M * has the following three properties:
(1) DSIC: Truth-telling is a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
(2) The highest bidder-who, by (1), has the highest value-wins the auction.
(3) The winner pays the second-highest bid, which by (1) is also the second-highest value.
Therefore, M * is functionally identical to the second-price auction.
